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However, the existence of a sale is without value because the dis-
claimer prevented the warranties from attaching to this transaction,
and strict liability was held not applicable. As Jackson now stands,
its sole significance would be that it protected hospitals by another
approach than that utilized by Perlmutter. However, because the dis-
claimer and strict liability are based upon public policy, courts in
the future may reach a different conclusion than that in Jackson.
Starting with Jackson's premise of a sale, a warranty would be applic-
able by voiding all disclaimers as unreasonable. Likewise, a more
"patient orientated" public policy would probably result in strict
liability being applicable.
RoY G. HARRELL, JR.
CONTRIBUTION BY FEEDER CORPORATION TO
PARENT FOUNDATION: CROSBY VALVE REVISITED
Charitable tax-exempt foundations' have often derived income by
operating feeder corporations: manufacturing or service businesses
whose purposes are profit orientated rather than for the eleemosynary
purposes of the tax-exempt foundation.2 When a charitable foundation
owns a feeder corporation, a tax problem is created when the feeder
corporation attempts to take a section 17o(b)(2)3 corporate charitable
"The INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 501(c)(3) provides:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to
influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political cam-
paign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
2Section 502 of the Code provides:
An organization operated for the primary purpose of carrying on a trade
or business for profit shall not be exempt under section 5o on the
ground that all of its profits are payable to one or more organizations
exempt under section 5os from taxation. For purposes of this section, the
term 'trade or business' shall not include the rental by an organization of
its real property (including personal property leased with the real property).
INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 502.
3Section 170 of the Code provides:
(a) .... There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution
(as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made within the taxable
year. A charitable contribution shall be allowable as a deduction only if
CASE COMMENTS
contribution deduction for payments made to the parent tax-exempt
foundation.
Such a situation arose in United States v. Knapp Brothers Shoe
Manufacturing Corporation4 when a feeder corporation attempted to
take a section 17 o(b)(2) charitable contribution deduction for payments
made to a tax-exempt institution, New York University.5 The Com-
missioner disallowed the deduction contending that the payments to
New York University were constructive dividends. Taxpayer-corpora-
tion paid the deficiency and instituted an action for refund in the
District Court of Massachusetts.
Three lawyers0 acquired Knapp Brothers Incorporated, a shoe
manufacturing business, to "confer an ultimate benefit on New York
University."7 The corporation was reorganized and the lawyers became
the shareholders of record of all the stock of the corporation. A clause
within the certificate of incorporation provided that no stockholder
would ever be entitled to dividends on his shares of stock or entitled
to the assets of the business in event of dissolution. Instead, New York
University was designated the sole recipient of income and property
derived from the business, irrevocably in perpetuam. The three lawyers
transferred the entire outstanding stock of the corporation to a voting
trust,8 at whose discretion funds could be distributed to the University.
The voting trust provided that after its termination, or its last exten-
sion, the stock of the corporation would be transferred to New York
verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate....
(b)(2) Corporations-In the case of a corporation, the total deductions under
subsection (a) for any taxable year shall not exceed 5 percent of the tax-
payer's taxable income ....
INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 170. See Note 18 infra.
4384 F.2d 692 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 39o U.S. 989 (1968).
r"Neither New York University, nor any of its officers, trustees or employees
had any part in the organization of plaintiff or provided any of its capital. The
University has never owned any stock in the plaintiff. Since the organization of
plaintiff no director, officer, trustee or employee of plaintiff has ever been an officer,
trustee or employee of the University. The University has never participated in
any way in the selection of the voting trustees or of plaintiff's directors or officers.
No trustee, officer or employee of the University has ever participated in, influenced
or attempted to influence, or consulted with the plaintiff's directors in connection
with the conduct of plaintiff's affairs. No trustee, officer or employee of the Uni-
versity has ever directed plaintiff to make a contribution to it, or requested such
a contribution, and plaintiff's directors have never consulted with the University
as to what contributions should be made." Knapp Bros. Shoe Mfg. Corp. v. United
States, 265 F. Supp. 133, 134 (D. Mass. 1967).
0One of the lawyers, John Gerdes, was General Counsel for New York Uni-
versity, and was a specialist in corporate finance and corporate reorganizations.
See J. GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS (1936).
7Knapp Bros. Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 133, 134 (D. Mass. 1967).
"See 5 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2075 (penn. ed. rev. vol. 1967).
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University. The District Court of Massachusetts9 allowed the deduction
reasoning that the payments were not motivated by a legal duty to
the University; they were made at the discretion of the voting trustees.
Therefore the payments were determined to be charitable contribu-
tions. However, the First Circuit Court of Appeals disallowed the
deduction, reasoning that New York University possessed the beneficial
ownership of the corporation and that the shareholders of record held
the stock of the corporation in trust for New York University; there-
fore the distributions were dividends.
Income of charitable, educational and scientific organizations has
been exempt from federal taxation since 1913.10 One of the conse-
quences of this exemption prior to 1954 was the ability of charitable
foundations to operate manufacturing businesses on a tax-exempt
basis because the "destination of income" '" of such corporations was
for eleemosynary purposes. Such feeder corporations had a competitive
advantage over private enterprise as their tax-exempt status enabled
them to use their profits tax-free to expand operations while their
competitors could expand only with profits remaining after taxes.12
The competitive advantage that feeder corporations derived by being
owned by charitable foundations gave rise to extensive congressional
hearings prior to 195o.13 These hearings resulted in the removal of
exemption of feeder corporations from taxation and the imposition
of the federal income tax upon them.14
However, the 1954 Internal Revenue Code does not specifically
prohibit a feeder corporation from taking a section 17o deduction
for contributions to its parent charitable foundation. Congressional in-
tention in removing the tax exemption of feeder corporations is there-
fore important in determining whether such a deduction is allowable.
The congressional reports indicate that "unfair competition" was
the principal reason for removing the exemption of such corpora-
tions.' 5 Congressional purpose was to equalize the tax burden borne
by private enterprise and by feeder corporations. The deduction
should, therefore, be allowed if the feeder corporation would derive no
'265 F. Supp. 133 (D. Mass. 1967).
"See Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II G (a), 38 Stat. 172. Provisions exempting
religious, charitable and educational organizations were contained in the Act of
Aug. 5, 19o9, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112, and the Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32,
28 Stat. 556.
'See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
12H.R. REP. No. 2319, 8ist Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1950); S. REP. No. 2375, 2d
Sess. 28 (1950).
'WHearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
"INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 502..
"H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (195o).
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competitive advantage thereby, but disallowed if such a competitive
advantage would be realized. The Code, merely imposes the same tax
on income derived by feeder corporations as is borne by their competi-
tors.'6
In Crosby Valve & Gage Company v. Commissioner17 the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was confronted with
the question of whether a feeder corporation could deduct contribu-
tions to its parent charitable foundation. The court determined that
the payment could be considered equally within the literal meaning
of a charitable contribution under section 170(c)18 and of a dividend
under section 3P6(a).19 If the payment were held to be a charitable
contribution, the feeder corporation could make a partially tax-free
distribution of earnings to its only stockholder. Such a distribution of
earnings would obtain a competitive advantage for the feeder corpora-
tion,20 which is precisely the inequality that Congress sought to pre-
15See S. REP. No. 2375, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. 29 (1950).
1 38o F.2d 146 (ist Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967). See 36 U. CIN.
L. REv. 331 (1967); 15 U. KAN. L. REV. 207 (1967).
28INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 170(c) reads in part:
Charitable Contribution Defined-For purposes of this section, the term
'charitable contribution' means a contribution or gift to or for the use
of-(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation (B)
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational purposes or for the prevention of cruelty to children
or animals; (C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual ....
IlrIN. REv. CODE of 1954, § 316 reads in part as follows:
For purposes of this subtitle, the term 'dividend' means any distribution of
of property made by a corporation to its shareholders-(2) out of its earnings
and profits of the taxable year .... Except as otherwise provided in this
subtitle, every distribution is made out of earnings and profits to the
extent thereof, and from the most recently accumulated earnings and
profits ....
"I'For example, suppose a competing business corporation not owned by a
charity (call it Hope Valve g= Gage Co.) and the petitioner (Crosby Valve & Gage
Co.) each has net earnings before taxes of Sio,ooo,ooo and each wishes to produce
the maximum return to its stockholders. Then if Crosby can deduct 5% of its
earnings by distributing that amount to its charitable sole stockholder and calling
it a charitable contribution rather than a dividend, the result is as follows:
Crosby Hope
Net earnings (N): ................................... $10,000,000 $10,000,000
Charitable deduction (D): ............................ 5ooooo 0
Taxable income (N-D.): .............................. 9,5oo,ooo 1o,ooo,ooo
Tax ('1) [47% (N-D) -$5,50o]: ....................... 4,459,500 4,694,500
Earnings available for distribution to
stockholders (N-7): .............................. $ 5,540,500 $ 5,305,500
If, on the other hand, Crosby's charitable stockholder is content with the same
1968]
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vent. Accordingly, the court held the payment to be a constructive
dividend and disallowed the deduction.
The lower court in Crosby Valve2' disallowed the deduction upon
other grounds. The court equated charitable contribution and gift,
then determined that a gift proceeds from "detached and disinterested
generosity." 22 The payment was found to have resulted from the
foundation's control over the feeder corporation, and not from de-
tached and disinterested generosity. The court of appeals rejected this
line of reasoning. The court stated that if a charitable motive were
the determining factor in ascertaining a charitable contribution, "an
important area of tax law would become a mare's nest of uncertainty
woven of judicial value judgments irrelevant to eleemosynary
reality."23
It has long been held that, "perhaps the most basic principle of
taxation [is that] economic realities determine tax consequences. '2 4
Crosby Valve determined that a wholly owned feeder corporation will
not be allowed a charitable deduction for payments made to its share-
holder of record, the parent foundation. In Knapp Shoe the court
extended the doctrine it enunciated in Crosby Valve, and determined
that a feeder corporation cannot make a charitable contribution to its
beneficial owner. It was held that when the beneficial owner of a
corporation receives an economic benefit from the corporation, for
no consideration, the benefit is a constructive dividend. "The crucial
concept in a finding that there is a constructive dividend is that the
corporation has conferred a benefit on the stockholder in order to
return earned by its competitor, Crosby has the option of retaining the difference
of $234,000 in earnings to finance competition in services, etc., or of cutting prices
to a level that produces $9,575,429 in net earnings, with the following effect:
Crosby Hope
Net earnings: ....................................... $ 9,575,492 $1oooo,ooo
Charitable deduction: ................................ 478,771 0
Taxable income: .................................... 9,096,578 10,000,000
T ax: ............................................... 4,269,929 4,694,500
Earnings available for distribution to
stockholders: ................................... $ 5,305,500 $ 5,305,500
In either case, Crosby would have precisely the competitive advantage that Congress
sought to prevent. Furthermore, if Hope chose to contribute any amount to charity,
even to Crosby's parent charity, that amount would reduce the amount available
to Hope's stockholders and thus would increase the disparity." Crosby Valve &
Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 38o F.2d 146, 149 n.3 (1st Cir. 1967).
OCrosby Valve &e Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 641 (1966).
2-See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (196o).
2338o F.2d 146 (ist Cir. 1967).
'AEstate of Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750, 752 (5 th Cir. 1961). See also
Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 461 (1959); Commissioner v. Court Holding
Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939).
1968] CASE COMMENTS 263
distribute available earnings and profits without expectation of re-
payment."2-5 The Code makes no distinction between legal and equit-
able stockholders; that is between the shareholders of record and the
beneficial owners.
It has been suggested that the use of the dividend approach to
determine the deductibility of payments made by a feeder corporation
to its parent foundation is difficult when a case in an analogous area
is considered.26 In Campbell v. Carter Foundation Production Com-
pany,27 taxpayer-feeder corporation borrowed funds from its sole
stockholder, a charitable foundation. The issue was whether certain
payments made to the foundation were interest on indebtedness as
claimed, therefore deductible, or constructive dividends and not de-
ductible. The court held that in the particular factual situation
genuine indebtedness existed between the feeder corporation and the
parent fundation and the payments were deductible as interest. The
case is distinguishable from Crosby Valve and Knapp Shoe in that
there was "expectation of repayment," 28 consequently the payments
were not constructive dividends.
Crosby Valve and Knapp Shoe are the only cases resolving the
question as to the deductibility of payments made by a feeder corpora-
tion to its parent foundation on a dividend theory. In a related case,
SICO Foundation v. United States,29 a corporation's certificate of in-
corporation provided that the corporation's earnings were payable, at
the discretion of its board of directors, to various state teachers col-
leges for scholarship purposes. Several presidents of state teachers col-
leges were directors of the corporation. The charitable deduction was
allowed, subject to the five percent limitation. Perhaps under the
doctrine of Knapp Shoe the charitable contribution in SICO might
now be disallowed.
Congressional purpose in taxing the income of feeder corporations
was to equalize the tax burden borne by feeder corporations and their
competitors. The question arises as to whether a feeder corporation is
penalized when its charter, as in Knapp Shoe, requires it to distribute
its earnings to its parent foundation. Crosby Valve and Knapp Shoe
disallow a charitable deduction when such a distribution occurs. These
decisions do not penalize such feeder corporations, as they do not deny
such feeder corporations charitable deductions. They only deny a
=I J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 9.07, at 16 (1962, Supp.
1968). "Proof of an 'economic benefit' is essential." Id.
236 U. CIN. L. REv. 331, 333-34 (1967).
"7322 F.0d 827 (5 th Cir. 1963).2 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
29295 F.2d 924 (C. CL. ig6i).
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feeder corporation a charitable deduction for distributing earnings to
its beneficial owner. The feeder corporation may deduct contributions
to any charity other than its beneficial owner. If a competitve dis-
advantage is suffered by such a feeder corporation, it is imposed by
the founders of that corporation.
Exemption from taxation was a congressional balm granted to
charitable foundations for motives begotten of public policy 3° The
resulting losses in tax revenues were deemed compensated for by the
value of the charitable work done.31 When it became apparent that
foundations were operating profit-orientated business on a tax-free
basis in competition with private enterprise, Congress taxed founda-
tions on their "unrelated business income."32 Charitable foundations
accordingly, have both exempt and taxable income. Thus charitable
foundations may take a charitable contribution deduction from their
taxable income for contributions made to other charitable foundations,
but not for payments to itself.3 3 If the management of a charitable
foundation controlled the management of a feeder corporation, or if
the management were identical as in Crosby Valve, the fundation
could direct the corporation to "contribute" to the foundation. If a
feeder corporation were allowed a deduction for charitable contribu-
tions to its parent foundation, then a foundation might be able to do
indirectly what it is proscribed from doing directly. A foundation
cannot contribute to itself. While such a distribution may be a charit-
able contribution in form, economic substance rather than form is
determinative of tax consequences.3 4
'0Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 151 (1934).
"See Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144 (1934); Erie Endowment v. United States,
316 F.2d 151 (3 d Cir. 1963); SICO Foundation v. United States, 295 F.2d 925, 930
n.i9 (Ct. C1. g6i).
"INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 511. Section 513 of the Code defines the term un-
related business as, "in the case of any organization subject to the tax imposed by
section 511, any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related
... to the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational,
or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption. INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 513. Accord, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 5 12(b)(1).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.52(b)-(g)(3) (1958) states:
The contribution, whether made by a trust or other exempt organization,
must be paid to another organization to be allowable. For example, a uni-
versity described in section 501(c)(3) which is exempt from tax and which
operates on unrelated business, shall be allowed a deduction, not in excess
of 5% of its unrelated business taxable income, for gifts or contributions
to another university described in section 501(c)(3) for educational work but
shall not be allowed any deduction for amounts expended in administering
its own educational program.
See also S. REP. No. 2374, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1950).
"Commissioner v. Hansen, 36o U.S. 446, 461 (1959); Commissioner v. Court
